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Images of Psychoanalysis: 
A Phenomenological Study of Medical Students’ Sense of Psychoanalysis 
Before and After a Four-Week Elective Course 
by Maurice Apprey 
Abstract 
In concept, an image has both verticality and horizontal dimensions. Saturated images within this 
space have a horizon and can exceed that horizon. Within that horizon where the image dwells 
something chances itself upon the observer and the observed. Into that public space between self 
and other, students bring an instrumental approach to how they plan to deploy their new fund of 
knowledge, only to discover that the setting itself has become an event where surprise and upheaval 
disrupt their illusion of self-continuity and the façade of familiarity. Phenomenologically, upheaval 
shows itself when givenness both precedes and participates in the giving of phenomena such as 
medical students’ “before and after” images of psychoanalysis. They discover and reconfigure their 
erstwhile absolute positions and values into reconfigurations of self and prior commitments. The 
turning point from their instrumental use of knowledge to reconfigurations of how they situate 
themselves in the world decisively comes when teaching and learning become an event in se that 
disturbs their sense of order. 
Following Husserl, phenomenological psychological observation has required us to go from the 
events of history to a sense of history. Would, however, that we could stay at the level of events much 
longer to see images explode and exceed their horizons from the illusion of order, and patterned 
repetition disrupted by surprise, upheaval and indeterminacy in the spirit of Alain Badiou! 
Context 
In 2014 the International Psychoanalytical Association 
(IPA) set up an Image Task Force chaired by Angela 
Mauss-Hanke to study how the field of psychoanalysis 
is perceived by non-psychoanalysts. This paper reports 
on one of multiple studies to achieve that end. 
The idea of an image is not a formal psychoanalytic 
concept but a descriptive one within the field of psycho-
analysis. Therefore, it is not a topic that has a cadre of 
published papers in psychoanalysis. For that reason, 
this account of the subjects’ images of psychoanalysis 
goes outside the field of psychoanalysis to deploy a 
descriptive phenomenological praxis to capture shared 
representations of the field of psychoanalysis. I will 
cite the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean–Luc Marion 
to provide conceptual borders for this study. This 
study is therefore not a study to add to the already 
rich body of either phenomenological philosophy or 
phenomenological psychology. Rather, this study is a 
limited use of a phenomenological praxis to capture a 
profile of the images medical students bring to medical 
school on their journey to become physicians and what 
happens after a four-week period of study. What will they 
do with a nuanced account of psychoanalysis within 
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their medical training? The subjects in this particular 
study are fourth year medical students who are taking 
a four-week intensive course on Freud, Klein, Kohut and 
Fairbairn and are interested in psychoanalysis for any 
number of reasons. After this fourth year, they would 
enter post-graduate residency programmes in psychiatry, 
pathology, paediatrics, anaesthesiology, obstetrics and 
gynaecology, among others. 
 
After capturing the intersubjective constitution of these 
medical students’ image or view of psychoanalysis, we 
shall dialogue our phenomenological findings with both 
psychoanalysis and phenomenologists in the broader 




If we are going to study images of psychoanalysis 
with a phenomenological praxis, we need to proceed 
from an understanding of what phenomenology is. In 
essence, it is a methodological attitude proposed by the 
German philosopher, Edmund Husserl, for looking at 
problems in the human sciences so that we may reflect 
on them and ask new questions accordingly. It is an 
open-ended praxis that requires a problem-centred 
attitude. This methodology is therefore a fitting one 
for studying shared images of psychoanalysis within a 
sample of medical students who have chosen to study 
psychoanalytic theories in a fourth year elective course. 
This study will thus give us an opportunity to study 
external world images of psychoanalysis in the first 
instance, and then to observe what those findings can 
contribute to psychoanalysis. In the end, external fields 
of reference to the internal world will interact with 
internal fields of reference to the outside. 
 
Long before phenomenology became a disciplined 
psychological research methodology, the psychoanalyst 
Heinz Hartmann (1964), well-known for his work on 
ego psychology, echoed Kronfeld (1920) in defining 
phenomenology as a preliminary approach for the study 
of any psychological theory that seeks to explain human 
phenomena genetically, that is, developmentally, to 
translate the denotation of “genetically” into modern 
psychoanalytic discourse. As such, for Kronfeld (1920), 
phenomenology is “a preliminary approach in the same 
sense that any psychological ontology is” (p. 394). More 
poignantly, Kronfeld adds, it is the precondition for the 
formation of theories; a precondition that nevertheless 
demands such theories. For, otherwise, phenomenology 
would remain essentially incomplete. 
 
From Basic Assumptions to Method of Inquiry 
 
It must be stated before we venture far afield that the 
term “image” is what the International Psychoanalytic 
Association used when they formed a research group 
to determine how the field of psychoanalysis tends to 
be viewed by non-psychoanalysts. Here image is very 
broadly conceived, and intentionally so, in order to 
allow the findings that emerge to include a wide range of 
conceptualizations comprising, among others, perception, 
representation, misrepresentation, prejudice, stereotypes, 
and so forth. My task here is not to debate the issue 
but to pose the question to non-psychoanalysts as such. 
 
Nuanced descriptions would therefore come out in the 
results. For that reason, the probe question posed in 
the present study is as follows: “What was your image 
of psychoanalysis before taking this elective course, 
and what is it now?” Without presupposition, it is our 
task to collect and faithfully reflect the subjects’ images 
as they present them, and then to interrogate their naïve 
descriptions in a systematic way. 
 
At the level of theory, broadly conceived, we have 
located several key thinkers in contemporary French 
philosophy – Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-Luc Marion, Alain 
Badiou and Francois Laruelle – who, along with 
Robert Sokolowski, are noted for their explication of 
their arguments for the closure of metaphysics. While 
this study is not about the closure of metaphysics, these 
particular scholars provide borders, pivots, direction and 
evocative metaphors that can enrich the deployment of 
a phenomenological method without compromising 
its frame or prejudicing our findings. I will demonstrate 
how their conceptual borders, pivots, direction and 
ruling metaphors fit into Giorgi’s open-ended praxis 
in ways that can enrich and deepen our findings. At the 
end, I will brace all that synthesis and enrichment on 
Giorgi’s praxis and extend its ends by, in the context of 
the current study and in dialogue with its theoretical 
framework, asking the following: “What happens when 
the elective itself becomes an event for our students?” 
 
In my use in this study of phenomenology to provide a 
broad conceptual frame within which to give an account 
of medical students’ shared sense of psychoanalysis, I 
will therefore deploy Sokolowski and four contemporary 
French philosophers who have done substantive work 
in the area of French reception of German philosophy, 
notably, Hegel and Husserl. 
 
Certain conceptual depictions of an image present 
themselves. We therefore start with a strategic and 
visual use of borders of the image between ground and 
sky to delimit the scope of our inquiry without risking 
presupposition. Vertically, Jean-Luc Nancy (2003/2005) 
tells us the following in a very powerful passage in 
his book, The Ground of an Image: 
 
Every image has its sky, even if it is 
represented as outside the image, or is 
not represented at all: the sky gives 
the image its light, but the light of an 
image comes from the image itself. (p. 
6; emphasis added) 
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Having suggested the verticality of an image, Nancy 
continues as follows: 
 
The image is thus its own sky, or the 
sky detached from itself, coming with 
all its force into the horizon but also to 
take it away, to lift it up or to pierce it, 
to raise it to an infinite power (p. 6; 
emphasis added). 
 
This verticality will now make room for a horizon that 
can both contain the image and overflow it. What must 
we do with what is contained within the horizon and 
that which overflows the horizon? 
 
Enter Jean-Luc Marion with his attempt to give us an 
account of absolute givenness, saturated phenomena and 
the surfeit of intuitions that overflow the horizon. 
  
Marion’s project is to overcome metaphysics without 
arriving at essences or grounding principles. To that 
end, Marion asks if the givenness in presence of each 
phenomenon can be realized without any condition or 
restriction. The phenomenological reduction conducted 
by deploying Husserl’s epoché would, in the hands of 
Marion, become the privileged practice. The epoché or 
bracketing of phenomena would enable the interrogating 
subject rigorously both to describe and circumscribe the 
phenomenon that gives itself. 
 
What would Marion do with his account of Husserl’s 
praxis? If, for Husserl, as Marion notes, givenness 
precedes and participates in the active process of giving, 
how would Marion then appropriate Husserl? Marion 
explicates, extends and expands this double meaning 
of givenness and the act of giving to arrive at the 
conclusion that “so much reduction, so much givenness” 
(Marion, 1989/1998, p. 203) must lead to this absolute 
irreducibility: “Givenness alone is absolute, free and 
without condition, precisely because it gives” (Marion, 
1989/1998, p. 33). 
 
If he wants to exceed the limits and conditions that he 
considers are imposed by Husserl’s phenomenology, 
what, then, would be Marion’s strategy? He introduces 
the concept of saturated phenomena – phenomena that 
tend to be classified as exceptional or marginal – in 
order to enrich our understanding of phenomenality 
beyond that of everyday phenomena such as objects. 
He describes four modalities that show themselves as 
saturated phenomena: (i) event, (ii) idol, (iii) flesh, 
and (iv) icon. 
 
Under the rubric of event, eventness is the priority that 
rules all phenomena. It is saturated in that the impact 
of a historical event is felt by an entire population or 
multiple populations. The meaning of a historical event 
cannot be grasped by a single interpretative gesture. 
Independent of any constituting subject, the phenomenon 
of eventness and what that means depends on ongoing 
and infinite processes of deciding what that event means 
to a population or how that event defines a historical 
community. James (2012) paraphrases Marion’s notion 
of the saturation of events as follows: “The event 
imposes itself upon a collectivity of individuals in excess 
of any singular intentional directedness or horizon of 
expectation” (p. 34; emphasis added). In Marion’s own 
words: “The plurality of horizons practically forbids 
constituting the historical event into one object and 
demands substituting an endless hermeneutic in time; the 
narration is doubled by a narration of the narrations” 
(Marion, 1997/2002b, p. 229; emphasis added). 
 
Under the rubric of idol as a saturated phenomenon, 
Marion points to a work of art as a privileged example. 
Here, the saturation occurs when a surfeit of sensible 
intuitions or sensory perceptions makes it difficult to 
account for a definitive meaning of a work of art. Due to 
this surfeit of sensible intuitions, a definitive accounting 
of meaning must be deferred. 
 
Under the rubric of flesh, Marion writes as follows: 
“Flesh shows itself only in giving itself – and, in this 
first ‘self’, it gives me to myself” (1997/2002b, p. 232). 
A first self, flesh is thus the originary sense impression 
that constitutes auto-affection. Prior to any intentional 
directedness of consciousness to any objectal pheno-
menon, flesh is the fundamental, originary medium of 
givenness that gives all affects attached to pleasure, 
pain, joy or suffering. As such, flesh therefore exceeds 
all intentions, significations, categories or classification. 
 
In contrast to the idol, icon offers nothing to the gaze. 
Not accessible to the gaze, icon operates in reverse. 
Operating in reverse, the icon imposes its own gaze 
upon the spectator. The icon is, then, the gaze of the 
other upon me as a donné. The icon is therefore not 
constituted by intentional consciousness. 
 
The phenomenological psychological researcher must 
now ask Marion: 
 
What if that which gives itself, as in the image of 
psychoanalysis, falls outside the boundaries of his four 
categories of saturated phenomena: event, flesh, idol 
and icon? 
 
We thus have a possible methodological limitation to 
Marion’s account of phenomenology. However, we can 
retain his reading of Husserl, where givenness precedes 
and participates in the process of giving, as well as 
his own privileging of absolute givenness. This we can 
definitely use. 
 
If givenness precedes and participates in the process 
of giving, what happens in the public space between 
the subject that perceives and the phenomenal object? 
For a handle on this, we turn to Robert Sokolowski’s 
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(2008) explication of the public space between the 
interrogating subject and the phenomenal object. 
 
Even though Sokolowski’s (2008) critique of Husserl 
was anticipated by Giorgi’s (1975, 1985) creation of a 
phenomenological praxis for studying the phenomena 
of human experience – is it nevertheless possible to 
find a place for Sokolowski’s critique of Husserl within 
Giorgi’s praxis? 
 
Before attempting to answer that question, let us follow 
Sokolowski’s argument in his critique of Husserl, 
which leads to the creation of an intersubjective praxis 
intended to be used to enrich Husserl’s constitution of 
judgment or predication. In Sokolowski’s words, 
 
Husserl’s description of the constitution of 
judgment or predication has the advantage 
of relating the knower directly to the thing 
known. When we predicate, we do not 
merely rearrange our mental representations 
of things; we allow the things themselves, 
the things given to perception, to appear 
in a new, more structured and articulated 
way. (p. 58) 
 
In order to “improve” Husserl’s account, Sokolowski 
(2008) strives to increase the publicity between two or 
more people who articulate an object in common. When 
two people perceive the same object perspectivally, 
“one person draws the other’s attention as well as his 
own to the object as a whole. The speaker names the 
object; the speaker establishes a reference for self and 
other by naming the object. The object becomes the 
subject that is going to be articulated. By using another 
term, the predicate, the speaker draws the attention of 
the interlocutor to some profile or feature of the object/ 
subject. By conjoining the subject and predicate terms, 
the speaker articulates “a new, fresh registration for the 
speaker as well as for the listener” (p. 59). The speaker 
thereby “‘installs’ categoriality into the experience and 
the object” (p. 59) both for himself and/or for the other. 
 
Following the installation of categoriality into the 
experience for self and other, Sokolowski states that “I 
would hold on to everything Husserl says, but I would 
locate it more clearly in an intersubjective context, and 
I would claim that the categorical forming ... is the 
achievement not of a single mind but of one mind 
working with another ... and doing so in public” (p. 61). 
 
In attempting to picture conceptually the idea of an 
image, where have we come from and where are we 
going? 
 
We began with Nancy’s verticality of an image and 
imagined with him what happens when the container 
overflows its horizon. From Marion we gained the idea 
of an event as a saturated phenomenon. Then, following 
Sokolowski, we asked what is achieved in the event of 
two minds intersubjectively creating categoriality in the 
public space between self and other. Even though he 
does not call this achievement an event, it is a place of 
negotiation between two minds about what gives itself 
and participates in the givenness.  
 
Alain Badiou (1988/2005) now follows, with an elaborate 
conception of being as multiple, inconsistent, and yet 
being inside a subset. This will have implications for 
what it means for humans to be inside, always within, 
and how our breaking out of the enclosure irrupts as 
the quintessential event. 
 
But first let us patiently and systematically follow the 
argument presented by Badiou, never losing sight of 
the event as the irruption and breaking out from within. 
 
In this praxis, ontology must address what can be said 
of being as a being as a starting point. The being of an 
object then is “what remains once all its contingent 
qualities or predicates such as weight, shape, colour, 
and material composition ... have been subtracted” 
(James, 2012, p. 135). What remains is the multiple; the 
multiple that is inconsistent and non-unifiable. 
 
In line with his philosophical project of determining 
ontology as mathematics, he reworks the philosophical 
question of the one and the multiple. Specifically, he 
names the reciprocal relationship of the one and being 
as the inaugural axiom of philosophy. But how is Badiou 
going to align the figure of one with being? 
  
I. If being and the unity of oneness are recipro-
cal, then multiplicity is not. 
II. Nevertheless, since the concrete presentation 
of being is invariably only a presentation of 
multiplicity, and 
III. Since multiplicity undeniably is, in se, the 
reciprocity of being, the sense of oneness must 
be reworked. 
IV. “If, then, philosophy does orientate itself 
according to the axiom that being and the one 
are reciprocal, then the impasse of the one and 
the multiple is the exact point where ‘philosophy 
is born and buried’.” (Badiou, 1988/2005, cited 
in James, 2012, p. 137; emphasis added)  
 
If philosophy is henceforth born and buried, Badiou’s 
decision becomes “the one is not” (Badiou, 1988/2005, 
p. 23). If the one is not anything that is or exists, the one 
is but an operation of counting as one (ibid., p. 24). 
 
Let us now reiterate Badiou’s praxis in the following 
distribution before addressing its implications. I shall 
paraphrase and schematize them:  
 
1. Subtract all contingencies from the objectal 
phenomenon and you get a pure being. 
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2. This being is multiple, and yet not a totalizable 
multiplicity but an inconsistent multiplicity. 
3. 1 ≠ multiplicity. 
4. We have an impasse. 
5. Consider, then, mathematics as a procedure 
of counting as one. 
6. We now have a presentation of a presentation. 
7. This presentation of a presentation can serve 
as a template or definition of bodies with a 
correlate of subjectivizable bodies. 
8. Representation is born in the opening of a 
space of creation that requires destruction. 
9. The imperative of being or of becoming a 
subject requires destruction and creation. 
10. The implication of destruction and recreation 
that follows enunciates the philosophical task: 
namely, to interpret the world and change it. 
 
To summarize Badiou – the capacity to realize the 
fecundity of purposeful life is what it means to be a 
human subject. In his work, there is no recourse to 
divinity, but rather to open-endedness and fullness of 
life. This capacity to realize the fecundity of life requires 
that human beings be able to elevate themselves to the 
grandeur and dignity of ideas that they can make their 
own. 
 
Lastly, we ask whether our medical students are bringing 
with them shared images of psychoanalysis that are 
pre-representational, representational or transcendent. 
And how can we move from presentation of being to 
representation? 
 
If this question is pertinent, we can turn to another 
philosopher intent on bringing closure to metaphysics 
by creating what he calls “non-philosophy”. In the work 
of Francois Laruelle (1986/2010), thought leaves the 
terrain of philosophy by leaving behind philosophy’s 
structuring principles. Laruelle leaves the structuring 
principles of philosophy behind by suspending them 
in a new discursive gesture, new thinking, new theory 
or new knowledge that becomes what he calls “non-
philosophy”. His is a new gesture that privileges the 
principle of indwelling. The principle of indwelling, or 
being intrinsic to something, characterizes the actuality 
of the real existing of that which is; that is, that which 
exists independently prior to any conscious apprehension 
of it. 
 
To give immanence the thought that it merits, it must 
be understood as that which is One, and as such thus 
undivided, independent, and resistant to conceptual 
transcendence and understanding. This One exists before 
splitting, which accompanies conceptual abstraction, 
shall have taken place. 
 
Laruelle’s philosophical decision, then, goes from 
presentation of being to representation in a sequence 
of steps, which proceed from conducting a systematic 
search for invariants and irreducible structures so that 
immanence and transcendence are (i) posed, (ii) divided, 
(iii) mixed, and (iv) synthesized into a greater unity. 
 
Integration into Giorgi’s Praxis of Nancy, Badiou, 
Sokolowski, Marion and Laruelle 
 
In order to demonstrate where our new metaphors fit 




Maintain the original Step 1 (collecting naïve 
descriptions of a phenomenon like the image of 
psychoanalysis); Step 2 (breaking up the naïve 
descriptions into meaningful units); Step 3 
(interrogating each meaning unit and deter-
mining eidetic psychological essences without 
essentializing them; and Step 4 (synthesizing 




In Step 2, treat each meaning unit as both a 
discrete unit, the count of one, as well as a 
possible subset of the whole phenomenon under 
interrogation. Without analysis of the naïve 
descriptions at this point, the researcher notes 
his or her intuitions of the embedded intuitions 




Transition into a co-creation of meaning in the 
public space in Step 3, treating the engagement 
of each unit to be interrogated as an opening 
for a public space between the interrogating 




In Step 3, bracketing of prior knowledge is now 
absolute, as is explicating saturated objects 
as well as other objects that give themselves 





In the discussion of the structures of experience, 
make a philosophical decision on the invariants 
identified in Step 4 leading to immanence and 
transcendence as (i) posed, (ii) divided, (iii) 
mixed, and (iv) synthesized. 
 
We are back to Giorgi’s relatively open-ended Husserlian 
phenomenological psychological research praxis that 
allows for what gives itself to be so described, deepened 
and constituted without the imposition of  presupposition. 
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Here now is the elaborated Giorgi praxis without 
compromising its frame. 
 
Phenomenological Psychological Praxis in the Public 
Space between Subject and Object of Investigation 
within Giorgi’s Praxis 
 
1. The researcher reads the entire description of 
the phenomenon, namely the nascent sense of 
ownership of the phenomenological project, 
straight through to get a sense of the whole. 
 
[In a second reading, between the naïve descriptions 
and the creation of the meaning units, inscribe Badiou 
so that we can anticipate discrete units in se as well 
as sets of thematic structures that provisionally give 
themselves.] 
 
2. The researcher reads the naive description a 
third time more slowly, delineating one 
transition in meaning from another with the 
intention of discovering the meaning of the 
phenomenon. After this procedure of using 
strokes to delineate where a transition is 
perceived, we have a series of meaning units 
or constituents that are then numbered. 
 
[Inscribe Marion’s accent on the absolute bracketing, 
and within that bracketing procedure, preserve 
Husserl’s and Giorgi’s free variation within the 
horizon. This is one area where Marion, Husserl and 
Giorgi are procedurally in complete agreement.] 
 
3. The researcher reflects on the meaning units, 
unpacking the constituents, and determines 
the essences (eidetic abstractions) of that 
situation for the subject with respect to the 
phenomenon under study. Each constituent 
meaning unit is systematically interrogated for 
what that unit reveals about the phenomenon. 
Each unit is then transformed into the language 
of psychological science. 
 
[In Step 3, following Sokolowski, (a) treat the engage-
ment of each unit to be interrogated as an opening 
for a public space between the interrogating subject 
and the phenomenological object; (b) transition into 
a co-creation of meaning.] 
 
4. The researcher synthesizes the essences (eidetic 
abstractions), integrating the aggregated insights 
into a coherent description of the structure of 
experience of the phenomenon under study. The 
structure of experience that leads to the inter-
subjective constitution of the focal phenomenon 
informs Giorgi’s results. 
 
In the discussion of the results, having deployed 
Giorgi’s phenomenological praxis to generate these, 
the researcher may now dialogue with the literature 
cited earlier and/or with other literature that further 
illuminates and/or extends the results. In Giorgi’s praxis, 
the phenomenological investigation conventionally ends 
with the discussion of the implications of the results 
for the discipline to which the study belongs. 
 
To this elaboration of Giorgi’s praxis, we may now add 
Laruelle’s contribution as follows: 
 
Inscribe Laruelle’s philosophical decision on the 
invariants leading to immanence and transcendence as 
(i) posed, (ii) divided, (iii) mixed, and (iv) synthesized. 
Laruelle’s philosophical decision can become an 
alternative to Giorgi’s fourth step where the multiple 
eidetic abstractions have now been gathered into the 
resulting essences. This framework does not compete 
with Giorgi’s framework. It brings firmer structure to 
it if the researcher so desires. The results may now be 
discussed in the light of existing literature in the field 
of study within which the investigation is conducted. 
 
The Resilience of Giorgi’s Phenomenological Praxis 
 
Giorgi’s research praxis retains its fidelity to Husserl. 
Nevertheless, aspects of the contribution from the 
works of Badiou, Laruelle, Marion and Sokolowski 
can be inscribed into Giorgi’s essentially descriptive 
Husserlian phenomenological psychological research 
praxis in order to intensify, deepen or extend the 
investigation. Hence the resilience of Giorgi’s praxis: 
it can retain its boundaries and yet accommodate new 
contributors without compromising the integrity of the 




Before analyzing the data following Giorgi’s praxis to 
disclose the image of psychoanalysis, the researcher 
must make his or her own phenomenological presence 
explicit. My phenomenological presence is two-pronged: 
a theoretical presence and an affective presence. At the 
theoretical level, I have always been intrigued that both 
Freud and Husserl were students of Franz Brentano, who 
taught them both the concept of intentionality. One took 
the concept in the direction of pure description as a 
philosophical praxis and tradition of phenomenology, 
while the other took it in the direction of interpretation 
of unconscious phenomena in psychoanalysis. This is 
where I struggle with the juxtaposition of disciplined 
description and interpretation. Here, I fluctuate between 
starting with pure description and ending with inter-
pretation. On occasion I find myself thrown into a place 
where I do not want to resolve that tension either in my 
clinical work as a psychoanalyst or in my explorations 
as a phenomenological psychological researcher. 
 
At the affective level, I am aware of how my difference 
as a Ghanaian enters into that public space between 
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clinician and patient (Apprey, 2006). Who am I when I 
become part of the very process I am observing in that 
public space between researcher and research subject? 
Who am I when I enter institutions of organized psycho-
analysis even when I am invited as a plenary speaker or 
as a panellist? Who am I when I add an extra bite, as it 
were, due to issues of identity and difference in the room, 
to an investigation of the image of psychoanalysis? 
 
These are phenomenological presences that must be 
bracketed before a disciplined study can occur. We can 
return to these phenomenological presences if they enter 
into the data. 
 
A Note on the Number of Subjects 
 
The researcher interviews as many subjects as needed; 
that is, until what gives itself reaches the level of 
saturation. In practice, then, five to ten subjects tend to 
be sufficient for a phenomenological study. By the same 
token, three subjects can theoretically provide sufficient 
data if the interviews are extensive enough to provide an 
optimal degree of saturation where one hears the same 
things said over and over again. 
 
Results of the Study 
 
Below are 8 representative results of the study of the 
image of psychoanalysis that emerged from individual 
analyses of the naïve descriptions collected. 
 
Subject #001 
In this student’s world the image of psychoanalysis 
has changed in four weeks on two fronts. On the one 
front, psychoanalysis can and has come alive from the 
dead. On the second front, when psychoanalysis stirs 
from the dead it can and has come to serve instrumental, 
present and peremptory purposes for a student doctor. 
Accordingly, a student doctor who wants to become an 
anaesthetist can apply the intellectual and human tenets 
of psychoanalysis to the treatment of patients who are at 
their most vulnerable stage in treatment; namely, the 
step just before anaesthesia; that is, before becoming 
unconscious to be operated on. In the intersubjective 
constitution of the image of psychoanalysis, there is a 
reciprocal connection in two directions: psychoanalysis 
in se is no longer dead; the student doctor is himself no 
longer dead to the value of psychoanalysis. 
 
Subject #002 
In this student’s world the image of psychoanalysis 
was at one time unclear, uncertain and undefined. In 
her naïve description, “I did not know very much about 
psychoanalysis. College and medical school gave me no 
understanding about how human beings come to live 
fulfilled lives”. In her world, Sigmund Freud had been 
synonymous with sexuality and how that came through 
dreams, and it behoved the psychoanalyst – who sat 
behind the patient, writing pad in hand – to decipher 
unconscious origins that drove human actions. 
 
When a psychoanalyst teaches a medical student about 
psychoanalysis, the student’s image of the field changes. 
The student begins to understand how difficult it is to 
understand unconscious human actions, thoughts and 
feelings. The student begins to appreciate that trust and 
relationship building serves as an infrastructure to 
clinical interventions, and that empathy is the primary 
instrument for entering the world of a patient. 
 
Through guided readings of multiple psychoanalytic 
frames of reference, the student begins to understand 
how far we have come since Freud and how “large” and 
multifaceted the traditions of psychoanalysis are. 
 
Reciprocally, when there is a discovery of psycho-
analysis as a large body of practices, the student’s own 
world becomes larger. As the image the student has of 




This student has come to a place where she can now 
realize that her initial image of psychoanalysis had been 
founded on misconceptions that come from Hollywood 
and popular culture. In this misconception, an analyst 
is one who sits behind a patient and asks: “How do you 
feel?” In this misconception, a patient goes to analysis 
simply to find “someone to talk to”. Analysis thus is for 
someone without an assigned “true” medical diagnosis. 
 
Before arriving at her current image of psychoanalysis, 
this student discovered that a person with a medical 
diagnosis could benefit from “a talking cure”; it was, 
however, not psychoanalysis, but cognitive behavioural 
therapy, that she encountered. Specifically, Freud was 
a philosopher, not a scientist; a philosopher obsessed 
with sex; a philosopher who sat around theorizing about 
the human psyche. 
 
Now, in the changed world of this subject, the image 
of psychoanalysis is that it can do many things with 
different goals. The image of psychoanalysis is that an 
analyst listens, and, beyond that, the analyst transforms 
anxiety, actively interprets meaning though dreams and 
the transference, and makes important links to past 
history. Most importantly, it is the “patient’s truth” 
that matters. That truth has to be understood through 
different or multiple lenses such as those of Freud, 
Klein, or Fairbairn. 
 
The image of psychoanalysis for this student is not 
passive listening but active listening to make meaning; 
not just Freud’s lens, but also others like Klein’s and 
Fairbairn’s; not just for talking to someone because one 
needed to, but rather for talking to an analyst because 
he is qualified to change the lives of patients whether 
or not they had a medical diagnosis. 
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Subject #004 
This student has perceived an evolution of his image 
of psychoanalysis from three way-stations: preceding 
medical school; third year psychiatric rotation; fourth 
year elective exclusively in psychoanalysis. 
 
From the perspective of the first way-station, the student 
shared the common views of psychoanalysis as depicted 
in the media of television and film where the analyst 
behind the couch was out of view while the patient who 
engages in free association arrives at “an epiphany” 
that solves the underlying psychological stress. 
 
The student’s disappointment in the medical school 
psychiatric teaching of psychoanalysis revealed itself 
as follows: Freud is mentioned once; psychotherapy is 
insufficiently taught; the privileging of evidence-based 
medicine above all else leaves the patient’s subjective 
experiences untouched. If a physician privileges rela-
tionship building in his or her practice, the staff is wary 
of the longer hours it takes to conduct a psychologically-
informed treatment in general medical practice. 
 
Finally, the psychoanalytic elective enabled the student 
to discover Kohut and psychoanalytic self-psychology, 
from where an idea such as “sustained empathic inquiry” 
can travel into a general medical practice. The subject 
comes away with a perceived imperative that physical 
and psychological health be seen as intertwined; that 
a physician must incorporate some understanding of 
psychological stressors into patient care; that a physi-
cian must study psychoanalysis in its multiple forms; 
in sum, that “being a good doctor means addressing 
the patient in a holistic manner, and understanding 
some amount of psychoanalytic theory is a crucial 
piece of the clinical puzzle”. 
 
Subject #005 
This student’s preconceptions included the following: 
that Freud “always blamed the mother”, that Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theories were “sexual in nature”, that 
the man behind the couch agreed with the patient’s self-
indulgent one-sided take on what happened in his or 
her childhood. 
 
Now the student understands how culture, instincts and 
parenting work together, and that how human beings 
react to culture, instincts and parenting is decisive in 
the formation of personality. The student’s new under-
standing of psychoanalysis includes the following: 
that Freud’s theories changed over time; that psycho-
analysis helps, through established relationships over 
time, with patients where unresolved issues from child-
hood can be refashioned and worked through; that 
instead of blaming the mother, transference became the 
medium for reactivating history and transforming human 
behaviour. As a prospective obstetrician/gynaecologist, 
the student has learned enough to know when to refer 
her patients for psychoanalysis. 
Subject #006 
In this student’s world, the image of psychoanalysis 
before exposure to it and the image of psychoanalysis 
after exposure to it are essentially the same even though 
differing in certain respects. 
 
The image of psychoanalysis as a means of helping a 
patient discover unconscious motivations in order to 
change unhealthy behaviours remains the same. 
 
The image of psychoanalysis has changed to include 
the following: that the unconscious mind is bifurcated 
between the dynamic unconscious and the preconscious 
mind; that the Oedipus complex can be taken literally in 
the case of some patients, and as one of many metaphors 
describing structures of mind in other patients; that 
psychoanalysis is not a unifocal discipline but has many 
pioneers, traditions, and practices for treating different 
patients. 
 
“Overall I was struck by the vast complexities of the 
theories in psychoanalysis. I have a greater apprecia-
tion for the field and for experts [in it] … . I have a 
greater appreciation for and understanding of the inner 
working of the human mind that ultimately affects our 
behaviour and interaction with one another.” 
 
Subject #007 
In this student’s world, psychoanalysis has a bifurcated 
image: the prior image that remains the same, and the 
image after exposure that has now acquired complexity 
and subtlety. 
 
The image that remains the same is that of the under-
standing that psychoanalysis brings to the exploration 
of unconscious human motivations. The image that has 
expanded includes an understanding that there is a 
child inside an adult. It is not quite the case that there 
is one theory of personality development for children, 
and another personality development theory for adults. 
Psychoanalysis grasps both continuity and discontinuity 
when the analyst encounters the child inside the adult. 
 
The changed image of psychoanalysis incorporates the 
understanding that adolescent development has a great 
deal to teach us about how parental empathy for 
adolescents has reciprocal and complementary impact. 
In one direction a parent may come to appreciate and 
enjoy with admiration and pride his or her fostering 
of the adolescent’s mastery over disturbing affects. In 
reverse, through the adolescent’s development, a parent 
completes his or her own maturation as a person while 
helping the adolescent child mature. 
 
In the student’s world, this ideal image of a psycho-
analytic view of adolescents’ and their parents’ mutual 
growth, and the potential for failure in that mutuality, 
resonates vehemently with the student’s own history 
given that, during the student’s adolescence, both the 
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student’s own father and the student’s best friend 
committed suicide; a preconscious motivation, thus, for 
taking this elective to learn more about psychoanalysis 
and the development of the human mind. 
 
Subject #008 
In this student’s world, and prior to his taking this 
elective, psychoanalysis was for him a field populated 
by vague, negative and self-serving practitioners with 
voyeuristic interests; images of psychoanalysts as 
compassionless villains; images fed by cartoons and 
the media. For this student there was profound conflict 
between his personal beliefs and his perception of 
mental health values. In this tension, his personal belief 
system says that there is indeed such a thing as the 
absoluteness of the existence of God and that He is 
absolutely good, whereas the student expects me and 
science to say that there are no absolutes. 
 
The student came to test and separate out his tensions, 
and used the elective as a place filled with events that 
enabled him to see how an analyst and phenomenolo-
gist thinks and works. 
 
The student found those moments when he and I thought 
similarly and cherished them. Subsequently he allowed 
his prior perceptions of psychoanalysis to fade away. In 
his world, when self and other think alike, they are one 
and conflict can fade away. 
 
Now he sees psychoanalysis as a place where religion 
and science can co-exist. Accordingly, the event of a 
psychoanalytic elective enabled him to construct the 
following view: psychoanalysis and religion are both 
subserved by the view that gathering and binding 
brokenness in human beings are processes that are akin 
to living and dying; dying and re-living; psychical 
integration in life, physical disintegration in death. 
 
For this student, an integration of Freud and Jesus 
happens in the field of genuine understanding and caring 
for patients. This is why the subject can now vow to be 
open-minded so that he can understand those human 
investments and intentions that lead to action. 
 
In Place of a Conclusion: Aggregate of Individual 
Results 
 
The aggregate of the intersubjective constitution of 
images of psychoanalysis across the subjects gives us 
the following. The sources of information that feed 
the image of psychoanalysis are varied. They include, 
among others, film and other media caricatures, an 
incomplete and incorrect fund of knowledge provided 
by parents, teachers and psychiatrists, and personal 
constructions of one’s own. The prevailing image of 
psychoanalysis is, therefore, not a singular one; rather, 
it is multi-faceted. That image is not a static one; rather, 
it is dynamic. It is not linear; rather, it is circular. When 
it is circular, there are internal fields of reference that 
resonate with external fields of reference. In reverse, 
there are external fields of reference that inform the 
internal world. As a consequence, as our images of 
psychoanalysis change, we ourselves are changed by 
that expansion of fields. Internal and external fold 
into each other (Deleuze, 1988/2006). A psychoanalyst 
ideally mediates the interpretation of images of psycho-
analysis by interrogating pretexts and prejudgments, 
historicizing contexts, and interpreting psychoanalytic 
texts with the subjects, modelling along the way non-
defensive and informed methods of describing and inter-
preting human phenomena. One explicit implication of 
this study is that psychoanalysts must teach wherever 
there are opportunities for them to do so: college 
students, medical students and residents of psychiatry, 
the general public, among others. In other words, while 
psychoanalysts spend years learning how not to be 
“wild” analysts who interpret without evidence, they 
do not teach outside their field enough to change wild 
images of their field. The following verbatim statement 
from Subject #008 addresses precisely this point: 
 
Dr Apprey 
Here’s where I must apologize to you for 
my initial resistance and hostility on that 
first day of class. I needed to understand that 
you were caring and open to the idea of 
discussing different views than [sic] your 
own (even though I had no idea whether 
our views even differed at all). I finally did 
realize how you thought when you discussed 
your patient who had told you he was 
cheating on his wife, and that “What she 
did not know would not hurt her”. Rather 
than assuming a neutral stance, you gave 
him a piece of your mind according to your 
own convictions that extend beyond your 
identity as a psychotherapist, an academic, 
and a researcher. Like me, you have morals 
that you hold on to, and from that moment 
on, I was able to relax. 
 
What the student conveniently leaves out is that I was 
challenging the blind omnipotence and megalomania of 
a patient who thought he could do whatever he wanted 
as long as his spouse did not know it. Importantly, it 
mattered to the student that I confronted the patient. It 
meant to him that we both had morals. What shook 
him up is the consonance. 
 
Some distortions, here and there, notwithstanding, this 
was a very important event for him. It was an event in 
the sense that it caused a rupture. By disturbing the 
continuity of his thinking about absolutes, it enabled him 
to endeavour to create his own mental conceptions that 
now include the juxtaposition of Freud and Jesus and 
how each can create a new setting for a fresh start in 
life. 
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Discussion: When the Engagement in the Public 
Space Between Self and Other Becomes an Event 
 
As noted earlier, Marion (1989/1998) has indicated 
that givenness precedes and actively participates in the 
act of giving. With that in mind, let us ask what happens 
when the potentially turbulent space that the observer 
and the observed occupy becomes an event? 
 
When we teach content, a process evolves. This is not 
new. However, when we consider the context of the 
teaching and the upheaval it can potentially cause, we 
have to pay attention. Badiou’s rendition of an event as 
surprise, upheaval and indeterminacy is pertinent here. 
 
My students sometimes say in private, and later in 
public, that “I wish Dr. Apprey would stop teaching 
psychoanalysis and just analyze us instead. We already 
know this stuff”. What happened that caused them to 
wish for a change in venue and in purpose? Or, “Oh 
my God, that is what exactly happened to me when … ”. 
Or, “I wish my mother were here to hear this. She told 
me not to take this elective. They always blame mothers. 
If she were to hear this she would feel affirmed”. Or, 
“I am sorry I attacked you. My father just died in Egypt. 
He committed suicide. And, my best friend committed 
suicide too when I was in adolescence. Do you know 
a good clinician I can go to and get help from?” Some-
thing happens to chance itself upon these students as 
they interrogate psychoanalysis as a subject, a field of 
study and of practice, through different lenses: Freud, 
Klein, Kohut and Fairbairn. 
 
Now let us go into more detail about the happening of 
an event. 
 
Earlier, when we introduced Badiou and his metaphors 
that we could inscribe into phenomenological praxis, 
we did not in fact go far enough. We noted that Badiou 
is particularly intrigued by the idea of subsets within a 
unit, a discreet unit, the count of one. 
 
In Badiou’s way of thinking, mathematics and logical 
structures tell us that we are invariably inside, in the 
immanence of a situation or world: always held within 
by that human animal inside us that is subjected to 
mathematical, biological and psychical laws. However, 
we cannot restrict ourselves, our being, to that inhuman 
inflexibility of structures, because chance shows us that 
something exceeds the structures. That which exceeds 
all human structures is the event that humans cause, 
and for them – “it can be said that the event is the 
occurrence or the flash, the dazzling revelation or an 
instant, of the void subjacent to the situation, buried 
in the structures” (Tarby, 2010/2013, p. 142). 
 
In phenomenology, we more or less arrive at our 
discoveries by going from the events of history to a 
sense of history and from there to the determination 
of intentionality. In psychoanalysis, we go from the 
event as historical reality to the privileged psychical 
reality that gives us our inner representational world, 
and from there to the transference wishes embedded in 
how the patient treats the analyst. 
 
This study makes me question whether we leave the 
events of history too soon to precipitously arrive at 
the sense of history or the representational world. 
Similarly, I realize that every time I have four to six 
students in an elective class, an event takes place, the 
class itself constitutes an event, and I must therefore 
periodically suspend the transfer of conceptual content 
or information in order to take the time to listen to 
that which is happening in that public space between 
me and my students; subjects of this study; co-creators 
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